Optimal enforcement policies under the threat of collusion and extortion by Mishra, Ajit
                                                              
University of Dundee
Optimal enforcement policies under the threat of collusion and extortion
Mishra, Ajit
Publication date:
2005
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Mishra, A. (2005). Optimal enforcement policies under the threat of collusion and extortion. (Dundee Discussion
Papers in Economics; No. 184). University of Dundee.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 19. Mar. 2016
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of 
Economic Studies, 
University of Dundee, 
Dundee. 
DD1 4HN 
 
 
Dundee Discussion Papers 
in Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT POLICIES 
UNDER THE THREAT OF COLLUSION 
AND EXTORTION 
 
 
Ajit Mishra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Working Paper 
 No. 184 
November 2005 
ISSN:1473-236X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
  
 
 
 
 
 
OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT POLICIES UNDER THE THREAT OF 
COLLUSION AND EXTORTION1
 
 
 
 
Ajit Mishra 
University of Dundee, Dundee, DD1 4HN, UK 
a.mishra@dundee.ac.uk
 
 
 
Abstract 
We consider a model of enforcement where the Principal relies on the Supervisor for 
information on the Agents. We argue that optimal policies must consider both collusion 
and extortion possibilities. Both collusion and extortion can be prevented by mechanisms 
resembling appeals process. However, if appeals involve a net cost for the agents, then 
optimal enforcement policy may involve over-enforcement or under-enforcement.
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Dilip Mookherjee, John Moore and Josef Sakovics for helpful discussions. Part of 
the work was done while I was visiting Delhi School of Economics and Cornell University.  Support from 
these institutions is acknowledged. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In many agency settings (government –taxpayer, regulator-firm), the principal 
relies on intermediate agents (supervisors) to obtain agent-related information, which is 
essential to the implementation of the principal’s objective. The fact that the supervisor 
can collude with the agent and hide or distort relevant information has been recognized in 
the recent literature on collusion and corruption. However, in much of the work, the 
distortion is only in one direction2. The supervisor takes a bribe (side payment) to submit 
an agent favourable report. Depending on the nature of the information, it is also possible 
that the supervisor can submit an agent-unfavourable report. In such a case, bribery might 
still occur but as a form of extortion3. Now the agent will be bribing the supervisor not to 
distort the true information, as opposed to the previous case where the agent bribes the 
supervisor to distort the information. 
Extortion is as important as the study of collusion.  If by paying a bribe to the 
inspector, I can avoid penalty for tax evasion then I will be tempted to evade taxes. 
Similarly, if by being an honest tax payer I might be subject to extortion by the inspector, 
I will be equally encouraged to evade taxes. Hence, both forms of corruption lead to 
distortion of incentives.  
Prevention of collusion between the supervisor and the agent has received lot of 
attention. This ranges from design of various incentive schemes (reward/penalty for the 
supervisor) to organization design (layers of supervision). In many of these cases one can 
design mechanism which can prevent collusion. However, it is not clear how they affect 
the extortionary behaviour of the supervisor. Do these schemes, proposed to prevent 
collusion, help reduce extortion as well or do they encourage extortion? Is it possible to 
design mechanisms which prevent both forms of corruption? Our objective in this paper 
is to investigate these questions. We show that there is a basic conflict between these two 
objectives. 
                                                 
2 Some authors have discussed the issue of harassment, but detailed investigations of information 
manipulation in the sense of the current paper are by   Polinsky-Shavell (2001) in a general enforcement 
context and  Hindriks et.al. (1999) in a tax evasion context. See Margit et.al.(2000 ) also. 
3 In the corruption literature the distinction is not always clear. For example the Shliefer-Vishny (93) model 
or the Bliss-di Tella (96) model can be viewed as models of extortion. These models however do not 
investigate the agency framework. 
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Beginning with Tirole’s (1986) early work, information is generally taken to be 
hard information. Hard information implies costless verification. This means that 
whatever information the supervisor obtains about the agent can not reported as 
something else. It can only be suppressed. Since this is important to the study of collusion 
and extortion, let us consider this issue in a more specific context. Suppose a supervisor 
is supposed to report on the level of pollution by a particular firm. The firm faces a 
penalty which is increasing in the level of pollution. The supervisor (with or without 
some effort) learns the true level of pollution with probability strictly less than 1. So the 
supervisor learns ‘nothing’ with positive probability. Collusion can take place when the 
supervisor learns about the true pollution level. If the information about pollution is hard, 
then a colluding supervisor can report only ‘nothing’ instead of the true level4. This way, 
the extent of collusion is limited because the agent is not entirely in the clear, the 
principal still can hold a prior belief about the agent’s pollution level. More importantly, 
extortion can never take place. Collusion is also prevented if the supervisor observes the 
true pollution level with certainty. 
In many other models of corruption, the informational assumptions are less 
explicit. In some models, the supervisor learns the true level with certainty but there is 
collusion and the supervisor reports some level other than the true level. Another leading 
model in the literature, Mookherjee and Png (1996), considers learning to be costly and 
hence the probability with which the supervisor learns depends on costly effort by him. 
But a colluding agent always reports a level of pollution which maximises the combined 
payoff of the supervisor and the agent. In that case, the information about the level of 
pollution is ‘soft’. Hence extortion can take place5. 
So if we allow for some information to be soft, there is always scope for 
extortion6. It has got another important implication. Now the supervisor need not report 
                                                 
4 Of course in equilibrium this itself may reveal some information. 
5 Mookherjee and Png (96) do mention this possibility.  Mookherjee (97) also considers extortion in an 
extension of this model. 
6 However, extortion need not be present for other reasons. One such reason is the presence of ex-post 
participation constraints. Suppose it is the efficiency of the firm which matters. The principal wishes to 
design suitable contracts for firms with various efficiency levels. In this case, reporting an inefficient firm 
as efficient would mean the firm will get a smaller transfer and support price. That might mean that the 
firm refuses to participate in the production process altogether and gets its reservation payoff. In most of 
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“nothing” in states where he has actually observed nothing. The supervisor can report in 
excess of the true level depending on the nature of his prior belief. Hence, in addition to 
elicitation information acquisition also becomes a problem. We would not only like the 
supervisor to tell the truth but also would like to make sure that the supervisor learns the 
truth more often7.  However, we shall assume that the supervisor always learns the true 
state. This way we avoid issues related to collusion under asymmetric information8.  
We consider a problem of enforcement to see how the optimal enforcement policy 
is affected by the presence of collusion and extortion. Our objective is to analyse the 
qualitative nature or rather the structure of the enforcement policy. We consider a 
situation where there are different levels of the illegal activity leading to different social 
costs and private benefits. Private benefits also differ across the agents. Many 
enforcement problems fit this case. Firms could choose different levels of pollution, 
individuals could use different degrees of tax evasion, drug abuse or different degrees of 
compliance to many laws. In these situations marginal deterrence becomes a key feature 
of the enforcement policy. Different agents may be allowed to choose different levels of 
the activities because their private benefits are different. In this context, we show how 
corruption might lead to under enforcement or over enforcement. Under enforcement 
refers to the case where certain acts are made legal even though the social cost exceeds 
the private benefit. This legalisation of the less harmful act is carried out so that better 
deterrence can be achieved in case of more harmful acts. The legalisation of certain drugs 
and the ‘overlooking’ of small offences are all examples of this.  What is novel in our 
analysis is the fact that the opposite- over enforcement can also be optimal. This means 
that even if some activity generates net positive benefit for some, it might be optimal to 
make it illegal.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we look at the problem of 
collusion and extortion in a fairly general setting.  We show that it is possible to design 
mechanisms which are both collusion and extortion proof. These require provision for 
                                                                                                                                                 
these models, the inefficient firm gets its reservation payoff after its type is revealed. Hence, the inefficient 
firm has no incentive to pay any bribe and there is no scope for extortion.    
7 It has been shown by Mishra (99) that in such cases one can have different compliance levels as multiple 
equilibria.  
8 See Laffont and Martimont (97) for a treatment of this and the associated problems of dealing with 
asymmetric information. 
 5
costly verification and we show that a system of appeals can serve the purpose. However, 
if the regulator is not able to choose transfers in an unconstrained fashion, the 
mechanisms will make appeals costly. Section 3 presents the basic model of enforcement 
with (at least) three levels of the activity. The optimal enforcement policy is discussed. 
Section 4 presents the main results concerning the nature of optimal policy under 
collusion and extortion. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.COLLUSION AND EXTORTION 
 
Consider an industry where firms are choosing the level of pollution. Suppose 
firms can choose between whether to pollute (p) or not (n). Later we shall allow for 
different levels of pollution. Firms derive some private benefit from the act of pollution 
(save costs) but there is a social harm associated with this act. An enforcement policy by 
the regulator will comprise of (1) the extent of deterrence to be achieved and (2) an 
enforcement mechanism {µ , f}, where  - µ is the  probability of detection (monitoring 
intensity) and  f is fine(s).  Social welfare SW = SW(a) – C(µ); where SW(a) is the total 
benefit to the firms minus the social cost and C(µ) is the cost of monitoring at the rate µ. 
We assume that all fines are subject to some limited liability constraint. Firms have 
common wealth W. 
With prob. µ the action is detected and fine f is imposed. Let Fp (Fn) denote the 
expected cost to the firm from choosing pollution (no-pollution). Note that this could be 
different from the original fines intended by the regulator. Assuming that no-pollution 
implies zero benefit and zero social cost, firms with benefit b will choose to pollute when 
b-µΔF> 0, where ΔF = Fp-Fn.  Optimal policy will be derived from the maximization of 
SW and it will imply that ΔF be set at the maximum so that μ can be minimised. We want 
to see whether an arbitrary ΔF≤ W can be implemented or not.  
We shall interpret this as an asymmetric information problem. Firm’s choice leads 
to two states, θ = p and θ = n. The regulator can not observe these states. The regulator 
(called principal P) relies on the information supplied by the regulation inspector 
(Supervisor S).  A firm is inspected with probability μ and if inspected, S can identify 
whether the firm has polluted (θ = p) or not (θ = n). Hence information acquisition by S 
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is not a problem. But S can manipulate the information. The supervisor S makes a report 
ms to the principal about the true state θ. We allow for the possibility that information is 
not always hard. So S can send a false report as well. We are concerned with two kinds of 
manipulations. 
Collusion: S can collude with A by taking a bribe and misreporting  θ = p as θ = n; ms = 
n. S and A can share the gain from such collusion.  
Extortion: S can also take a bribe so as not to report θ = n asθ = p; ms = p.  
Even though both these types of manipulation can affect the implementation of 
ΔF in a similar fashion and both involve bribery, they differ in at least two fundamental 
ways. Firstly, collusion is more of a cooperative venture and extortion is not. Extortion 
involves threat by S to misreport and this threat may not be credible. Secondly, collusion 
takes place in the state where the illegal act has been committed. So there are affected 
parties who have incurred some cost or damage and hence collusion between S and A 
always runs the risk of discovery.  This has been capture in the literature in the form of 
transaction cost in collusion. A bribe of x paid by A to S is worth kx to S, k<1. Similar 
transaction cost need not be there in case of extortion.  We want to see whether and how 
ΔF can be implemented.  
A mechanism M will specify how reports will be made and how transfers will be 
made conditional on these reports. Let ms, ma denote the reports made by S and A 
respectively. Since both of them observe the state with certainty, we will not consider 
cases where they can report nothing. Hence mj , j = S, A. Let t}{ pn,∈ j (ms, ma) denote 
the transfer specified by M.  We can consider simultaneous or sequential reports by S and 
A.  
Timing: 
(i)The regulator announces the mechanism M. 
(ii) Firms choose whether to pollute or not. A firm (A) is inspected with certain 
probability and the inspector (S) learns the true state θ. 
(iii) The inspector (S) and the firm (A) can agree on side contract and play the 
mechanism M according to this contract. We can allow unlimited communication 
between them, but assume that the firm makes the bribe offer which the inspector can 
refuse or accept.  
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(iv) If no such side contract has been agreed in (iii), they play M non-cooperatively. 
(v) All payoffs according to M are realised. 
Revelation Principle: The revelation principle has been a cornerstone of mechanism 
design. Intuitively, if true states are being reported, it will also imply that there is no 
collusion taking place between S and A. However, truthful revelation does not exclude 
extortion.  
Let kp (kn) denote the transaction cost associated with bribery in state θ = p (θ = 
n). As discussed earlier, kp< kn.  Let ΔF = f. Then there is a mechanism M which can 
induce truthful revelation of information. We can have  
ts(n,n) = ta(n,n) = 0, ts(p,n) = -g,                                                                                 (1) 
 ta(p,n) = -(f + ε) , ts(p,p) =kpf and ta(p,p) = -f.   
It can be seen that when θ = p, there is no incentive for S and A to collude and ms = p , 
ma = p.  However, when θ = n, inspector S will have an incentive to report p. Since ε >0, 
A is better off reporting p as well. But A can then offer a bribe x ≤ f such that knx >kpf .  S 
will accept such an offer and report n. So in either state the true state is being reported 
but A has to pay a bribe x in state θ = n and pay a fine f in state θ = p. Hence ΔF = (f-x) < 
f.  Hence, in equilibrium we have truthful revelation but the agent has to pay a bribe to 
the supervisor.   
Note that preventing collusion is only part of the problem. Suppose θ = p, and S 
makes a true report without colluding with A. We also want A to report the same, 
becasue A can otherwise report n. On the other hand when θ = n and S reports m = p, we 
want A to report n. This way extortion can be prevented. If extortion is not prevented, a 
fully revealing equilibrium might exist but it might fail to implement the desired ΔF. This 
suggests that we need mechanisms which are both collusion-proof and extortion-proof.  
We shall use the notion of strong implementation and consider cases where there is no 
equilibrium where collusion or extortion takes place. 
This implies that the transfers ta(p,n) must take different values depending on the 
true state. Let θ = n. S will make a true report if and only if ts(n,n) > ts(p,n). Similarly, 
when θ = p, we need ta(p,p)>ta(p,n). In addition we also need the no collusion constraint 
to hold. Hence the transfers must satisfy the following  
k[ta(n,n)-ta(p,p)] < [ ts(p,p)-ts(n,n)]                                                                                  (2) 
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Since extortion can take place only if the firm does not challenge the inspector’s false 
report, we need ta(p,p) > ta(p,n). When the actual state is n and the inspector reports it as 
state p, the agent must report the true state n. In that case, the supervisor realises ts(p,n) 
which is less than the payoff from truth telling ts(n,n). These two conditions can not be 
satisfied 9 .  Hence it can be checked that using reports alone it is not possible to 
implement all possible ΔF.   
Verification: Investigations and Appeals 
The previous discussion shows that we need some verification. We shall consider 
two types of verification procedures. 
The regulator can commit to verify the reports in certain states. In that case the 
mechanism will specify not only the transfer but also the probability with which 
verification will be undertaken following any pair of reports. Given that verification is 
costly and the regulator would like to minimise costs, verification will not be undertaken 
in all possible states. So we want to implement ΔF in the least cost way. Let q(ms, ma) be 
the probability that verification is undertaken when the supervisor and the agent report ms 
and ma respectively. It is easy to check that either q(n,n)> 0 or q(p,n) > 0.  Clearly the 
mechanism with q(n,n) > 0 will not be preferred since this involves costly verification in 
equilibrium. We shall focus only on such mechanisms. Moreover, we are constrained to 
choose transfers satisfying the limited liability constraint. In addition we also assume that 
post-verification transfers can not be entirely arbitrary. For example, suppose both report 
n and the true state is deemed to be n and the principal announces some transfer without 
any verification. On the other hand suppose following any pair of reports, verification is 
undertaken and the true state is found to be n. The agent has to be treated symmetrically 
in these two cases. Transfers to the agent can not be very different from the previous 
transfers where the agent was accepted as a non-pollutant. Lastly, verification is 
imperfect so that the true state is revealed with probability δ > ½.   
Consider the following mechanism q((ms,ma),t(ms,ma)) with  
q(n,n) = q(p,p) = 0, q(p,n) = 1, 
 ts(n,n)= ta(n,n)=0, ts(p,p)=kfa, ta(p,p)= -fa ,                                                                 (3) 
                                                 
9  We can of course consider weak inequalities and these two can be satisfied as an equality. Hence there is 
one equilibrium where neither collusion nor extortion takes place, but there are also other equilibria where 
this is not true. 
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 ts(p,n;n)= -fs  and ta(p,n;p)=- fx-ε, ts(p,n;p)= kfa  and ta(p,n;n)=- fy+ε. 
The last row refers to the transfers when verification is undertaken following a report of p 
and n by S and A respectively and the verified state is n or p.  Clearly this above 
mechanism is both collusion and extortion proof. 
Our second restriction on transfers imply that fy = 0. In that case, the regulator can 
not set a high fine ta(p,p) because ta(p,p) < δ ta(p,n;p)≤δW.  We can summarise this in 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: There exist mechanisms such that neither collusion nor extortion occurs in 
equilibrium. No mechanism can implement ΔF > ΔFδ where ΔFδ < W for δ < 1. 
This implies that it won’t be possible to implement very high fines and in these cases, one 
will have to raise the monitoring probability μ..10  
Alternatively, we can separate the problems of collusion and extortion. Instead of 
having a mechanism which prescribes verification, the mechanism can be supplemented 
by a system of ‘appeals’ where the agent can appeal. Appeals differ from investigations 
in two distinct characteristics. First, verification is no more a decision variable of the 
regulator and limited commitment on the part of the regulator will not affect the appeals 
process. Second, appeals will involve a cost for the agent. A successful appeal can lead to 
reimbursement of cost but as we shall see, it might still leave some costs for the agent to 
bear.  
Consider a mechanism M with appeals of the following kind11.  S submits its 
report ms. If ms = n, then the game ends and both get zero. If ms = p, then A can either 
accept or appeal. If A accepts then S gets a transfer kf and A pays the fine f. However, if 
A appeals then it incurs a fixed cost C irrespective of the outcome. The appeal leads to 
the true state being upheld with probability δ. So if θ = n, appeal is upheld with 
probability δ and if θ = p, it is upheld with probability 1-δ. If the appeal is upheld, S pays 
Ts and A receives Ta ≤Ts.  If the appeal is rejected, S receives   kf and A pays the fine f.   
For the mechanism to be extortion proof, we need that whenever θ = n, A should appeal 
following a report of ms = p. Then S would get δ(-Ts) + (1-δ)kf. S would always report 
                                                 
10 In such cases, we might have mechanisms with q(n,n)>0.    
 
11 The extensive forms for different states are depicted in figure 1 and figure 2. 
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truthfully if δ(-Ts) + (1-δ)kf <0 or, Ts > (1-δ)kf/δ.  It is clear that A would choose to 
appeal if δ(Ta+f) ≥ C or Ta ≥ C/δ –f.  On the other hand, when θ = p, we need A to 
accept whatever S reports. A would accept a report of ms = p, if C ≥ (1-δ)(Ta+f) or Ta ≤ 
C/1-δ –f.  Both these are satisfied for any C and f if δ >1/2. In addition, this mechanism is 
also collusion proof. Whenever, θ = p, the supervisor would report truthfully since no 
bribe smaller than f would induce him to collude with A.  Hence this mechanism is both 
collusion and extortion proof. We summarise this in the following Proposition. 
Proposition 2: There exists a mechanism M which is both collusion and extortion proof. 
It implements any desired ΔF. 
The ability to implement any set of fines (ΔF) crucially depends on the regulator ability 
to choose transfers Ts, Ta. However, if the regulator can not choose transfers arbitrarily, 
the agent might incur a net positive cost in appeals. Suppose Ta = αC where α is some 
constant. In that case, if the we want to implement a large fine, α has to be small so that 
no appeal is made in sate θ = p. But a small α would mean that, for some fines, the agent 
might not appeal as the fixed cost of appeal might outweigh the benefit. In that case one 
can still implement large fines but not small ones.  
Corollary 3: When appeals involve a positive net cost, it may not be possible to 
implement ΔF ≤ ΔFc.   
 
3. ENFORCEMENT AND MARGINAL DETRRENCE 
 
We consider an extended version of the previous model of enforcement12. There 
are three types of firms denoted by X, Y and Z. Each firm chooses pollution level an∈ A, 
where A = { a0, a1, a2 }13 with the corresponding harm to the society being 0, h1, and h2.   
Let  bj(an)  denote the private benefit to type j firm ( j = X,Y,Z) from action an (n = 01,2). 
We assume that they are as follows14: 
X- 0, b1,  b2
                                                 
12 This is a slightly modified and discrete version of Mookherjee and Png (94). They have studied marginal 
deterrence in absence of collusion or extortion.  
13 So a0 can be interpreted as θ = n of the previous section. But there are two polluting (p) states. 
14 The exact specification is not crucial, we need some kind of sorting condition. Z derives more benefit 
than Y both in absolute and marginal sense. Similarly for, Y and X. 
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Y- 0,2 b1,2 b2                                                                                                                                                                       (6) 
Z- 0,3 b1,3 b2 
Firms are all risk neutral. Firm’s type information is not available to the regulator. Hence 
the regulator can not condition monitoring intensity on the firm’s type. Hence all firms 
are subject to same rate of monitoring. Fines differ across actions but not across firm 
types. Their utility from any act is given by Uj = bj (an) - μfn , j = X,Y,Z  and n = 0,1,2 
where μ is the probability of apprehension and f refers to the fine for the particular act.   
We assume that 3b2-h2 > 3b1- h1 >2b1-h1 > 0 > 2b2-h2 > b1-h1> b2-h2                              (7) 
Social welfare is given by  
SW= .                                                                                            (8) )()( μChab n
j
j
nj −−∑
It is clear that when the cost of enforcement is zero, the first best action profile for 
X,Y and Z would be given by 
aX =  a0 , aY = a1 and aZ = a2                                                                                                                    (9)     
For much of the analysis we shall assume that C(μ) = cm μ, where the cost of monitoring 
is cmμ per  firm. The regulator would choose an action profile to be implemented by a 
policy/mechanism {μ, f0,f1,f2}. Firm’s identical wealth is given by w. Hence we assume 
that fn ≤ w for all n. Note that the regulator may not always implement the fist best 
schedule. In particular we shall consider two kinds of cases. We shall refer to action 
schedules {a0,a0,a2} and {a1,a1,a2} as over enforcement and under enforcement.  In the 
first case even though a firm’s benefit from an action exceeds the social cost associated 
with it, the firm is prevented from choosing the particular action. In the second case, a 
firm might be allowed to chose an action even if the harm exceeds the private benefit. In 
our particular case of {a1,a1,a2}, the regulator has effectively  legalized action a1.  It is not 
trying to deter anyone from choosing a1. 
Enforcement in the Absence of Collusion or Extortion: 
Clearly, f0 = 0 and f2 = w. The optimal pattern of behaviour would be one of the 
possibilities shown in Table 1.  If the monitoring cost cm is not too high, then optimal 
choice would be to implement (0, a1, a2) and social welfare is given by S = 3b2-h2+ 2b1-h1 
– (2b2-b1)cm/w. This is highest if (h2-h1) – 2(b2-b1) – (b2-b1)cm,/w >0 and h1 – b1 – b1cm/w 
>0. Notice that over-enforcement (0,0,a2) is never optimal. If (0,0,a2) can be 
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implemented, so can be (0, a1, a2); the latter outcome has lower monitoring cost and 
greater benefits. 
It can also be seen from the Table that the optimal enforcement policy might 
change as cost of monitoring goes up. There exists a c0 such that for all  cm > c0, the 
optimal policy would be to legalise a1 and implement (a1,a1,a2) 15 . Certain harmful 
activities may be legalised not because their private benefit exceed the social costs, but 
because legalisation of these activities makes it easier to achieve deterrence from more 
harmful activities. In the present example we can also have (0, a2,a2) as an optimal 
policy16. This  differs from  the previous case in the sense that there is under-enforcement 
but it is at the top end. No act has been legalized but now the Y types are not being 
prevented from the more harmful act a2. 
We can summarise this benchmark case in the following Proposition 
Proposition 4:  
(i) For sufficiently large W or small Cm, {a0,a1 ,a2} is always the optimal 
enforcement policy. 
(ii) Over enforcement is never optimal. 
(iii) For larger values of Cm, under-enforcement {a1,a1 ,a2} legalisation of the less 
harmful act is optimal 
Proof: The details are given in the appendix. 
 
4. OPTIMAL POLICY UNDER COLLUSION AND EXTORTION 
 
Suppose the inspector is corruptible and can under report. Hence mechanisms discussed 
in Section 2 which seek to elicit the true information would come into picture. Recall that 
in our framework, the firm proposes a bribe in the side contract stage. We shall continue 
with this assumption. Most of the qualitative results won’t be affected by this.  
Let Fn be the expected total cost to the firm from act an. This would include fine 
and possible bribe payment. If the firm colludes with the inspector and an is reported as 
am, m <n and the firm pays a bribe z, then Fn = μ(fm + b). An action an is collusion proof, 
                                                 
15 This is so if h1-b1 < b1Cm/w. 
16 This is likely to happen when the difference  between the harms is not very large; (h2-h1) < 2(b2-b1) +(b2-
b1)cm/w. 
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if the firm and the inspector can not collude to under report n as m. Similarly, an is 
extortion proof if an can not be reported as am, m > n.  A mechanism M is collusion proof 
(extortion proof) if all the actions are collusion proof (extortion proof). Let c be the net 
cost of choosing appeal. For the remainder of the section we take kp = k and kn = 1. 
Hence bribery under collusion involves transaction cost. 
Collusion 
 It is clear that collusion alone does not affect the optimal policy. This is because 
collusion can be prevented without adding to the enforcement cost. Recall that transfers 
do not enter our social welfare function. This is true of public enforcement situations but 
transfers will matter in private enforcement situations. In that case there the regulator 
might have to take into account the cost of preventing collusion.  
Proposition 5 : Let a be the optimal schedule of actions when there is no collusion 
possibilities. Then, it is also optimal even when there is collusion possibility. 
Proof:  If the mechanism induces collusion, then cost of enforcement is always higher 
and in some cases no deterrence can be achieved.  However, collusion proof mechanisms 
exist and the optimal action schedule a can be enforced using such a mechanism. Since 
rewards and fines do not enter our social welfare function, the inspector gets kfn for 
reporting action an.  This means that they do not gain anything by colluding and hence 
always report the truth. So Fn = μfn.  
Extortion 
As discussed earlier, possibility of over reporting also affects the firm’s choice of 
action by affecting Fn. A firm choosing say a1 will not only have to face a fine f1 but 
might have to pay an extortion bribe k(f2-f1). The inspector gets kf2 by reporting the firm 
as a2 and the firm accepts and does not appeal. On the other hand, the inspector gets kf1 
by reporting a1. Hence the firm will offer a bribe of k(f2-f1) to avoid being over reported. 
This is possible if the firm is not going appeal following the inspector’s report a2. As we 
saw in the previous section, the firm will not appeal if the net appeal costs are high 
compared to the fines.  
Before we discuss the mechanism with appeals let us see how extortion will affect 
the incentives of the firms. From the table it is clear that (a0,a1,a2) can be implemented by 
setting μ = (2b2-b1)/w, f0 = 0, f1= b1w/(2b2-b1), f2 = w and rn = kfn.  It can be checked that 
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this policy will not implement (a0,a1,a2) if firms can be over reported. Note that all firms 
can be simply reported as a2. In that case the a0-type firm will have to pay a bribe of kf2. 
The a1- type firm will pay a fine of f1 and a bribe of k(f2-f1). The a2-type firm can not be 
over-reported and hence pays a fine f2.   Can (a0,a1,a2) be implemented now? Even though 
one would expect that enforcement has become severely distorted now, it is still possible 
to implement (a0,a1,a2) in some cases. 
Note that we need,  
-F0 ≥ b1- F1 and -F0 ≥ b2- F2                                                                                            (10) 
-F0 ≤ 2b1- F1, 2b1 –F1 ≥ 2b2- F2                                                                                       (11) 
-F0 ≤ 3b2- F2, 3b1 –F1 ≤ 3b2- F2                                                                                                                                 (12) 
Using the fact that F0 = μkf2, F1 = μ(kf2+(1-k)f1) and F2 = μf2, it can be checked that 
(a0,a1,a2) be implemented if the following pairs of inequalities are satisfied. 
3(b2-b1) ≥ μ (1-k)(f2-f1) ≥ 2 (b2-b1)          
2b1≥ μ(1-k)f1 ≥ b1                                  
3b2 ≥ μ(1-k)f2 ≥ b2          
 
Example 1: Let b1= 8, b2 = 15, W = 44 k = ½. It can be checked that for f0=0, f1 = 16, f2 = 
22 and μ = 1, we can satisfy all the above conditions and (a0,a1,a2) can be implemented. 
However, as one would expect, μ has to be higher.  
With extortion possibilities, (a0,a1,a2) may be implemented in some cases but cost 
of enforcement can never be lower than the case without extortion. The above example 
shows that (a0,a1,a2) can be implemented with extortion. Let the optimal mechanism be 
(μ, f0,f1,f2). When there is no extortion, the regulator can always choose the same 
monitoring intensity with (μ, f/0, f1/, f/2)  such that f/0 = kf2, f/1 = kf2+(1-k)f1 and f/2 = f2. 
This would suggest that one could do better by considering extortion proof mechanisms. 
Following the results of the previous section, we consider mechanisms where the firm 
can appeal following the report by the inspector. We simplify the analysis by restricting 
attention to simple appeals process where the true state (action an) is revealed with 
certainty following an appeal and the firm bears some cost c. Suppose the true state is an 
and it is reported as am, m >n . This would mean that a firm would appeal if c<fm-fn. If the 
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firm is going to appeal, the inspector is never going to misreport. This mechanism would 
give the same results as the mechanism in Proposition 2 and Corollary 3, whenever the 
transfers Ta are bounded above due to some constraints. 
We also assume that c < w, so that there is some scope for the mechanism to be 
extortion proof. This also means that a0-type firm may not appeal if reported as a1, but it 
would appeal if reported as a2. This would further constrain the regulator over the choice 
of {fn}. A mechanism is extortion proof if all the actions are extortion proof. However we 
might have mechanisms where only a1 (a0) is extortion proof but not a0 (a1).  
The value of the appeals process can be seen in the following claim. Consider the action 
schedule (a0,a1,a2).  If it can be implemented by an extortion proof mechanism, then no 
other mechanism can implement (a0,a1,a2) with lower cost. However, (a0,a1,a2) can not be 
implemented in some cases. The following proposition shows that this is the case. 
 
Proposition 6: The first best outcome (a0, a1, a2) can not be implemented by any 
mechanism even when wealth w is large enough to enforce complete deterrence, when 
the judicial cost c lies in the interval [c*   c**]. In such cases it might be optimal to have 
over-enforcement. 
Proof: We shall show that such an interval exists. Let the interval be given by the 
following  
 )(4**,
3
)(3* 12
12
12 bbc
bb
wbbc −=−
−= 17.  
Suppose there exists mechanism implementing (a0,a1,a2) such that  no act is extortion 
proof. So a0 will be reported as a1 and a1can be reported as a2. However, in equilibrium 
true reports will be obtained but the firm would have paid bribes to the inspector to report 
the truth. Hence the expected payments for the different acts are given by 
F0 = μkf1, F1 = μ(kf2+(1-k)f1) and F2 = μf2.  
Now to ensure that Y chooses a1 and not a2, we need 
μ (1-k)(f2-f1) ≥ 2 (b2-b1)                                                                                                 (13) 
                                                 
17 Assume k = ½, for illustration purpose only. In addition, b2 is assumed to be large compared to b1 such 
that 12b2-4b1-w >0. This ensures that such a condition can be satisfied. Otherwise the interval might be 
empty. 
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With extortion threats, to implement (0, a1, a2), f1 has to be brought down and that makes 
 is 
 not a1, we need 
                                                  (14) 
                                              (15) 
t 
(f2-f1) large. Note that inequality (13) implies that (f2 -f1) ≥ 2 (b2-b1)/(1-k). That means, 
(f2 -f1) >c.  Hence, act a1 is now extortion proof and such a mechanism does not exist. 
Next, suppose, (a0, a1, a2) can be implemented using a mechanism such that act a1
extortion proof. Then the expected fines are given by 
F0 = μkf1, F1 = μ(f1) and F2 = μf2.  
To ensure that Z will choose a2 and
3(b2-b1)≥  μ(f2-f1)                                                       
Similarly to ensure that X chooses a0 over a1, we need 
b1/(1-k) ≤ μf1                                                                   
Since a0 is not extortion proof but a1 is, we can not make f1 very small. Suppose we wan
to maximize (f2-f1)  subject to these two constraints. It is clear that (f2-f1)  will be 
maximized when f2 = w and b1 = (1-k)μf1. Using this and k = ½,  we get 
12
1
1 bb3
wb2f −≥  
or, (f2-f1) ≤ 
12
12
bb3
w)bb(3
−
−                                                                                                 (16) 
But this implies that (f2-f1) < c and hence act a 1 can not be extortion proof. 
xtortion proof 
                                                                                (18) 
ment the first best so that all the acts are extortion proof? 
Given that b2 is large compared to b1, this is also not possible. Notice that to have no 
Now suppose, (0,a1,a2) can not be implemented by  (μ,f1,f2) such that a0 is e
and a1 is not. Then the incentive constraint of firm Y will be 
2b2- μf2 ≤ 2b1- μ(f1+f2)/2               
Or, μ(f2-f1) ≥ 4 (b2-b1)                    
But (18) is exactly same as (14) and hence given the values of c we have a contradiction 
that a1 is not extortion proof. 
Lastly, is it possible to imple
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extortion at all we need f2 > 2C and given the lower bound on c in the proposition this 
implies18 3b2 < 5b1. 
It may not be possible to implement the first best outcome even without extortion 
possibil ies, if w is qit uite low. But that is not the case here. In fact w may be large enough 
so that
on (A1).  Note that c also belong to the interval mentioned in the 
to 
implem
 that over-enforcement can be 
optima
s mentioned 
earlier,
                                                
 more deterrence than the first best can be achieved.  If w >2b2, then we can 
implement a policy of over enforcement (a0,a0,a2). This can be achieved by setting f1= f2 
= w and μ = 2b2/w. This would never have been optimal when (a0,a1,a2) could be 
implemented, but now over-enforcement can be an optimal policy  for certain values of 
cm,h1 and h2.   
Example 2: Let b1 = 8, b2 = 15, w = 40, h2 = 35, h1 = 15 and c = 24. Clearly these values 
satisfy conditi
proposition, c ∈ (22    28). It can be checked that (a0,a1,a2) can not be implemented. 
However, (a0,a0,a2) can be implemented  by setting μ = ¾, f1=f2 = 40. Now for 
monitoring cost cm <12, the policy of over-enforcement dominates all other policies. [] 
The above proposition does not claim that first best can be implemented when c 
lies outside the interval. Depending on the values of b1 and b2, it may be impossible 
ent the first best even if c lies outside the interval. 
Similarly, the optimality of the policy of over-enforcement does not depend on 
the inability to implement the first best. We shall show
l even when it is possible to implement the first best action schedule. 
We now turn attention to situations where the first best can be implemented. 
However, this need not be the optimal policy if monitoring cost is high. A
 the optimal policy in such situations might involve legalization of some of the 
less harmful acts (a1 in this case).  Does the presence of extortion make a difference to 
this result? Note that when c is low the least cost implementation of the first best involves 
no extortion. Since c <w, the implementation of (a1,a1,a2) also involves no extortion. 
Hence for very small values of c, the presence of extortion possibilities does not make a 
difference to the legalization issue.  
 
18 In this case f2 = w, hence w > 6(b2-b1)w/(3b2-b1) or, 5b1>3b2. 
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Proposition 7:  
(a) Legalization of the less harmful act a0 is more likely to be an optimal policy in the 
xtortion possibilities. 
-ness.  
out olicy even without corruption because of the enforcement cost 
orcement policy is affected by the presence of 
ion. In particular, we are more likely to see under or over 
enforce
sion. Measures to control collusion are likely to encourage 
extortio
                                                
presence of e
(b) A mechanism with partial extortion proof-ness may not be better than another 
mechanism with no extortion proof
(c) Over-enforcement (a0,a0,a2) may be optimal even when it is possible to implement the 
first best (a0,a1,a2). 
 Proof:  Details are given in the Appendix. Part (a) is easy to see. Under enforcement turn 
 to be the optimal p
µcm. Since with corruption, µ is going to be higher, it is possible that under enforcement 
is optimal for a greater range of values of cm given benefits and costs. Part (b) shows that 
it is not possible to rank mechanisms according to the degree of extortion. We saw in 
Proposition 6 that over enforcement can be optimal when it is not possible to implement 
the first best. Part (c) shows that over enforcement can be optimal even when first best 
action schedule could be implemented.   
5. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that optimal enf
collusion and extort
ment as optimal policy responses in such situations. The possibility of under 
enforcement has been noted in the literature19, but the paper shows that over enforcement 
can also be optimal.  
We have also shown that extortion possibilities complicate the mechanism design 
problem under collu
n20.  It is possible to design mechanism which would prevent both collusion and 
extortion. But these mechanisms would require extensive set of transfers. In many cases, 
this requires separate institutions. For example, even though the regulator designs the 
monitoring intensity, the fines and the rewards, appeals are judged by outside institutions 
 
19 See Mookherjee and Png (1994). They also report over enforcement but for different reasons. 
20 This conflict has been noted by Polinsky and Shavell (2000), but they don’t consider the full range of 
mechanism design. 
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(courts). The regulator may not have much control over the planned transfers following 
such an appeal.    
Moreover, in our model, there is no appeal in equilibrium. This follows from the 
restrictive set up. There is no scope for frivolous appeals. It is possible to extend the 
model 
Bliss, C. and R. di-Tella, 1996, Does competition kill corruption? Journal of Political 
blic Economics 74, 395-430..  
rica 65, 875-911. 
l Economy 16, 75-94. 
ent Economics. 
ersity Press, Cambridge.) 
to capture the appeals process more appropriately. 
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A
P  : 
attern of behaviour can be derived as follows. The Table below gives the 
 and social welfare SW associated with different action 
 satisfy 
d - μf0 ≥ b2-μf2
we need 
t to these constraints. It is clear that f0 = 0 and f2 = w. We 
he right hand side of () or () as binding. Hence μf1 = b1. Using it in () we 
                                                
The optimal p
least cost policy (μ, f0,f1) 
schedules21.  The three rows refer to the first best, under enforcement and over 
enforcement respectively.  Note that to implement (a0,a1,a2) we need  the policy to
the following. 
For X to choose a0, we need 
-μf0 ≥ b1-μf1 an
For Y to choose a1 we need, 
2b1-μf1 ≥ -μf0, 2b1-μf1≥ 2b2-μf2
Likewise, for Z to choose a2, 
3b2-μf2 ≥ -μf0, 3b2-μf2≥ 3b1-μf1
Combining these inequalities we have, 
3b2 ≥ μ (f2-f0) ≥ b2
3(b2-b1) ≥ μ (f2-f1) ≥ 2(b2-b1) 
2b1≥ μ(f1-f0)≥b1
We want to minimise μ subjec
can have either t
 
21 We have not considered many other possible combinations of actions for reasons of brevity. These can be 
obtained from the author. 
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get μ = (2b2-b1)/w. Since b2> b1, this also implies that 2b2-b1 > b2. On the other hand if 
μf2 = b2, the last inequality will not be satisfied. Hence μ = (2b2-b1)/w is the lowest 
monitoring intensity. The other numbers in the table follows. 
Similarly, we can find the minimum μ for other schedule of actions. 
 
Table 1 
Behaviour μ ines Welfare F
X Y Z  f0 f2  f1
0 a2 (2b2 )/w 0 b1w 1) w 3b2-h2  (2b2-
b1)C /w. 
a1 -b1 / (2b2-b + 2b1-h1 –
m
a1 a1 a2 2(b2-b1)/w 0 0 w 3 – 
2( . 
b2-h2+ 2b1-h1 + (b1-h1) 
b2-b1)Cm/w
a0 a0 a2 2b2/W 0 W W 3b2-h2+  – (2 b2 )Cm/w. 
       
Proof of Proposition 7 
hen there is no extortion possibility, (a1,a1,a2) can be optimal if cm is not very low. 
,  (a1,a1,a2) can always be implemented by an extortion proof 
 
. 
ion-proof.  It can 
 
m will be {µ = 4/9, f1= 21, f2= 30}.It can be 
checked that µ can not be lowered. Now the total expected fines for the three acts are 
(a)  W
Since judicial cost c <w
mechanism. Hence it is optimal also. In addition, implementing (a0,a1,a2) in the presence 
of extortion implies a higher μ, it is likely that higher monitoring cost would outweigh
the benefit of implementing (a0,a1,a2) and (a1,a1,a2) would be optimal.  
(b)  Let b1 = 6, b2 = 7, W = 30, C = 21. Suppose we wish to implement policy (a0,a1,a2)
It can be implemented by a mechanism where neither a0 nor a1 is extort
be verified that {µ = 2/5, f1 = 20 and f2 = 30} will implement this policy. To see this, the 
expected total fine for a0 = (10)2/5 = 4. The total expected fine for act a1 = (20 + 10/2) 
2/5 = 10 and the expected fine for a2 = (30)2/5 = 12. Given this X will choose a0  since -4 
≥ 6-10 > 7-12. Similarly, Y will choose a1, since 12-10 ≥14-12 > -4. Lastly, Z will 
choose a2 because 21-12 > 18-10> -4. 
On the other hand we can also implement (a0,a1,a2) by another mechanism where a0 is
extortion proof.  The optimal mechanis
 22
F(a0) = 0, F(a1) = (21+9/2)4/9 = 102/9 and F(a2) = 120/9. Hence X will prefer act a0. Y 
will choose a1 since 12-102/9 ≥ 14-120/9 > 0 and Z will choose a2. 
Hence to implement (a0,a1,a2), mechanism {µ = 2/5, f1 = 20 and f2 = 30} is better than
= 4/9, f1= 21, f2= 30} as the latter involves higher monitoring cost. But the second 
mechanism has less extortion. The opposite result will be obtained if 
 {µ 
C =16. Now {µ = 
2) 
we can not have any other outcome implementing (a0,a1,a2) with  a 
lower µ.  
At the same time one can have a policy of over enforcement (a0,a0,a2)   with f1= f2= 33 
owever a welfare loss of (2b1-h1) in over enforcement. Hence over enforcement 
plement (a1,a1,a2) with f1= 0, 
f2= 33 and µ = 10/33. Comparing this with the policy of over enforcement, the latter is 
better if
m = 16. Clearly both the inequalities are satisfied. It can be checked that 
this is true for a range of values and not just these two.  
However, it remains to be shown that the policy (a0,a1,a2) was indeed optimal when there 
 WFB = (33-h2) + (12-h1) – (16/33)Cm
 WO = (33-h2) - (22/33)Cm
2/5, f1 = 15 and f2 = 30} can implement the policy at the same cost, but the least cost a0-
extortion proof mechanism is {µ = 2/7, f1 = 16 and f2 = 30}.  
(c )  Let b1= 6, b2= 11 W = 33 and C = 18. For these parameter values, enforcing (a0,a1,a
would mean choosing an a1-extortion free outcome with  the following fines and 
monitoring intensity. 
f1 = 15, f2 = 33 and µ = 4/5 
It can be verified that 
and µ = 2/3. Hence the over enforcement policy leads to a cost savings of (2/15)Cm. 
There is h
is better than the policy if implementing the first best iff 
 (2/15)Cm> 12-h1. 
But is it also better than under enforcement? Once can im
f 
h1 – b1 < 2b1-h1 + (2/33)Cm 
Let h1 = 10 and C
is no extortion possibility. From table 1 it can be checked that  
 23
 WU = (33-h2) + (12-h1) - (h1-b1) -  (10/33)Cm 
Clearly, WFB> WO. In addition,  WFB> WU for the  values of  Cm = 16 and h1= 10. Hence 
,a2) in the absence of extortion possibilities, 
y of over enforcement when there is extortion.[] 
 
 
even though it is optimal to implement (a0,a1
it may be optimal to have a polic
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